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ABSTRACT
Humans are the final decision makers in critical tasks that involve
ethical and legal concerns, ranging from recidivism prediction, to
medical diagnosis, to fighting against fake news. Although machine
learning models can sometimes achieve impressive performance
in these tasks, these tasks are not amenable to full automation. To
realize the potential of machine learning for improving human de-
cisions, it is important to understand how assistance from machine
learning models affects human performance and human agency.
In this paper, we use deception detection as a testbed and investi-
gate how we can harness explanations and predictions of machine
learning models to improve human performance while retaining
human agency. We propose a spectrum between full human agency
and full automation, and develop varying levels of machine as-
sistance along the spectrum that gradually increase the influence
of machine predictions. We find that without showing predicted
labels, explanations alone slightly improve human performance
in the end task. In comparison, human performance is greatly im-
proved by showing predicted labels (>20% relative improvement)
and can be further improved by explicitly suggesting strong ma-
chine performance. Interestingly, when predicted labels are shown,
explanations of machine predictions induce a similar level of accu-
racy as an explicit statement of strong machine performance. Our
results demonstrate a tradeoff between human performance and
human agency and show that explanations of machine predictions
can moderate this tradeoff.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has achieved impressive success in a wide variety
of tasks. For instance, neural networks have surpassed human-
level performance in ImageNet classification (95.06% vs. 94.9%) [29];
Kleinberg et al. [36] demonstrate that in bail decisions, machine
predictions of recidivism can reduce jail rates by 41.9% with no
increase in crime rates, compared to human judges; Ott et al. [60]
show that linear classifiers can achieve ∼90% accuracy in detecting
deceptive reviews while humans perform no better than chance.
As a result of these achievements, machine learning holds promise
for addressing important societal challenges.
However, it is important to recognize different roles that machine
learning can play in different tasks in the context of human decision
making. In tasks such as object recognition, human performance
can be considered as the upper bound, and machine learning models
are designed to emulate the human ability to recognize objects in an
image. A high accuracy in such tasks presents great opportunities
for large-scale automation and consequently improving our soci-
ety’s efficiency. In contrast, efficiency is a lesser concern in tasks
such as bail decisions. In fact, full automation is often not desired
in these tasks due to ethical and legal concerns. These tasks are
challenging for humans and for machines, but with vast amounts of
data, machines can sometimes identify patterns that are unsalient,
unknown, or counterintuitive to humans. If the patterns embedded
in the machine learning models can be elucidated for humans, they
can provide valuable support when humans make decisions.
The goal of our work is to investigate best practices for integrat-
ing machine learning into human decision making. We propose a
spectrum between full human agency, where humans make deci-
sions entirely on their own, and full automation, where machines
make decisions without human intervention (see Figure 1 for an
illustration). We then develop varying levels of machine assistance
along the spectrum using explanations and predictions of machine
learning models. We build on recent developments in interpretable
machine learning that provide useful frameworks for generating
explanations of machine predictions [34, 35, 45, 50, 64, 65]. Instead
of using these explanations to help users debug machine learning
models, we incorporate the explanations as assistance for humans
to improve human performance while retaining human agency
in the decision making process. Accordingly, we directly evaluate
human performance in the end task through user studies.
In this work, we focus on a constrained form of decision making
where humans make individual predictions. Specifically, we ask
humans to decide whether a hotel review is genuine or deceptive
based on the text. This prediction problem allows us to focus on the
integration of machine learning into human predictions. In compar-
ison, prior work in decision theory and decision support systems
focuses on modeling preferences and utilities as well as building
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Figure 1: A spectrum between full human agency and full automation illustrating howmachine learning can be integrated in
human decision making. The detailed explanation of each method is in Section 3.
knowledge databases and representations to reason about complex
decisions [5, 31, 33, 55, 67]. Moreover, since many policy decisions
can be formulated as prediction problems [37], understanding hu-
man predictions with assistance from machine learning models
constitutes an important step towards empowering humans with
machine learning in critical challenging tasks.
Deception detection as a testbed. In this work, we use deception
detection as our testbed for three reasons. First, deceptive infor-
mation is prevalent on the Internet. For instance, Ott et al. [58]
find that deceptive reviews are a growing problem on multiple plat-
forms such as TripAdvisor and Yelp. Fake news has also received
significant attention recently [43, 74] and might have influenced
the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in 2016 [3]. Enhancing
humans’ ability in detecting deception can potentially alleviate
these issues.
Second, deception detection is a challenging task for humans and
has been extensively studied [1, 2, 22, 24, 60]. It is promising that
machines show preliminary success in prior work. For example,
machines are able to achieve an accuracy of ∼90% in distinguishing
genuine reviews from deceptive ones, while human performance
is no better than chance [60]. Machines can identify unsalient and
counterintuitive signals, e.g., deceptive reviews are less specific
about spatial configurations and tend to include less sensorial and
concrete language. It is worth noting that we should take the high
machine accuracy with a grain of salt in the general domain because
deception detection is a complex problem.1 The task introduced by
Ott et al. [60] nevertheless provides an ideal sandbox to understand
human predictions with assistance from machine learning models.
Third, full automation is not desired in critical tasks such as
deception detection because of ethical and legal concerns. The
government should not have the authority to automatically block
information from individuals, e.g., in the context of “fake news”. Fur-
thermore, full automation may not comply with legal requirements.
For instance, in the case of recidivism prediction, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that “judges be made aware of the limitations
of risk assessment tools” and “a COMPAS risk assessment should
not be used to determine the severity of a sentence or whether
an offender is incarcerated” [47, 71]. Similarly, the trial judge is
required to act as a gatekeeper regarding the evidence from a poly-
graph (lie detector) [70]. Therefore, it is crucial to retain human
agency and understand human predictions with assistance from
machine learning models.
1For instance, one can argue that it is impossible to fully address the issue of deception
in online reviews only based on textual information as an adversarial user can copy
another user’s review, which becomes a deceptive review but with exactly the same
text as a genuine one.
Organization and Highlights. We start by reviewing related
work to provide the necessary background for our study (Section 2).
Our focus in this work is on investigating human predictions with
assistance from machine learning models in the context of decep-
tive review detection. To explore the spectrum between full human
agency and full automation in Figure 1, we develop varying lev-
els of assistance from machine learning models (Section 3). For
example, the following three levels of machine assistance gradu-
ally increase the influence of machine predictions: 1) showing only
explanations of machine predictions without revealing predicted
labels; 2) showing predicted labels without revealing high machine
accuracy; 3) showing predicted labels with an explicit statement of
strong machine accuracy.
In Section 4, we investigate human performance under different
experimental setups along the spectrum. We show that explana-
tions alone slightly improve human performance, while showing
predicted labels achieves great improvement (∼21% relative im-
provement in human accuracy). However, this improvement is still
moderate compared to “full” priming with an explicit statement of
machine accuracy (∼46% relative improvement in human accuracy).
Our findings suggest that there exists a tradeoff between human
performance and human agency. Interestingly, when predicted la-
bels are shown, explanations of machine predictions can achieve a
similar effect as an explicit statement of machine accuracy. We also
find that humans tend to trust correct machine predictions more
than incorrect ones, indicating that they can somewhat identify
when machines are correct.
We further examine the effect of statements of machine accuracy
by varying the accuracy numbers (Section 5). Surprisingly, we find
that our participants are not sensitive to statements of machine
accuracy and are more likely to trust machine predictions with an
accuracy statement than without, even if the accuracy statement
suggests poor machine performance. These observations echo with
prior work on numeracy and suggest that it is difficult for humans
to interpret and act on numbers [6, 62, 63, 69]. We also find that
frequency explanations (e.g., 5 out of 10 for explaining 50%) can
help humans calibrate the accuracy numbers. Note that we do
not recommend these presentations on the spectrum because they
present untruthful information.
We discuss the limitations of our work and provide concluding
thoughts regarding future directions of investigating best practices
for integrating artificial intelligence into human decision making
in Section 6.
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2 RELATEDWORK
We summarize related work in two areas to put our work in context:
interpretable machine learning and deception and misinformation.
Interpretable machine learning. Machine learning models re-
main as black boxes despite wide adoption. Blindly following ma-
chine predictions may lead to dire repercussions, especially in sce-
narios such as medical diagnosis and justice systems [9, 36, 73].
Therefore, improving their transparency and interpretability has
attracted broad interest [34, 35, 45, 50, 64, 65], dating back to early
work on recommendation systems [13, 30]. In the case of general
automation, researchers have also studied issues of appropriate
reliance and trust [8, 18, 44, 61, 76].
There are two major approaches to providing explanations of
machine learning models: example-based and feature-based. For
example, an example-based explanation framework is MMD-critic
proposed by Kim et al. [34], which selects both prototypes and
criticisms. Ribeiro et al. [64] propose a feature-based approach,
LIME, that fits a sparse linear model to approximate non-linear
models locally. Similarly, Lundberg and Lee [50] present a unified
framework that assigns each feature an importance value for a
particular prediction.
We would like to emphasize two unique aspects of our work:
task difficulty and interpretability evaluation. First, compared to
categorizing text into topics and object recognition, deception de-
tection is a challenging task for humans and it remains an open
question whether humans can leverage help from machine learn-
ing models in such settings. Second, we directly measure human
performance in the end task. In comparison, prior work in inter-
pretable machine learning aims to help humans understand how
machine learning models work and/or debug them, the evaluation
is thus mostly based on either the understanding of the models
or the improvement in machine performance. Concurrently, sev-
eral recent studies have also examined how explanations relate to
human performance [10, 23]. Our work also resonates with the sem-
inal work on mixed-initiative user interfaces [31] and intelligence
augmentation [4]. In addition, our work is connected to cognitive
studies on understanding effective explanations beyond the context
of machine learning [48, 49].
Deception and misinformation. Deception is a widely studied
phenomenon in many disciplines [75]. In psychology, deception
is defined as an act that is intended to foster in another person a
belief or understanding which the deceiver considers false [41]. To
detect deception, researchers have examined the role of behavioral,
emotional, and linguistic cues [17, 19, 39, 42, 54, 75].
Since people are increasingly relying on online reviews to make
purchase decisions [11, 72, 78, 81], machine learning methods have
been used to detect deception in online reviews [22, 24, 32, 60,
77, 79]. An important challenge in detecting deception in online
reviews is to obtain the groundtruth labels of reviews. Ott et al.
[60] create the first sizable dataset in deception detection by asking
Amazon Mechanical Turkers to write deceptive reviews. Deceptive
reviews can also be seen as an instance of spamming and online
fraud [2, 16, 27, 56].
More recently, the issue of misinformation and fake news has
drawn much attention from both the public and the research com-
munity [21, 43]. Most relevant to our work is Zhang et al. [80],
which explores varying types of credibility annotations specifi-
cally designed for news articles. In addition, Nyhan and Reifler [57]
demonstrate the “backfire” effect, which suggests that corrections
of misperceptions may enhance people’s false beliefs, and Vosoughi
et al. [74] show that fake news is more innovative and spreads faster
than real news.
It is worth noting that deception detection is a broad and complex
issue. For instance, fake news can be hard to define and may not be
easily separated into two classes. Moreover, detecting fake news
is different from detecting deceptive reviews as the former task
requires other skills such as fact checking. It is important to note
that our focus in this work is on investigating how humans interact
with assistance from machine learning algorithms in decision making.
We thus adopt the task of distinguishing genuine reviews from
deceptive ones based on textual information in Ott et al. [60] as a
sandbox. Our results on this constrained deception detection task
can potentially contribute valuable insights to future solutions of
the broader issue of deception detection.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND HYPOTHESES
Our goal is to understand whether machine predictions and their
explanations can improve human performance in challenging tasks,
such as deception detection, and how humans interpret assistance
from machine learning models. In this section, we first present our
task setup and then develop varying levels of machine assistance
along the spectrum introduced in Figure 1. We finally formulate
our hypotheses and define our evaluation metrics.
Experimental setup. We employ the deception detection task
developed by Ott et al. [60] and evaluate human performance in
this task with varying levels of machine assistance. The dataset in
Ott et al. [60] includes 800 genuine and 800 deceptive hotel reviews
for 20 hotels in Chicago. The genuine reviews were extracted from
TripAdvisor and the deceptive ones were written by turkers. We use
80% of the reviews as training data and the remaining 20% as the
heldout test set. Since the machine performance with linear SVM in
Ott et al. [60] already surpasses humans (∼50%) by a wide margin
and linear classifiers are generally considered more interpretable,
we follow Ott et al. [59] and use linear SVM with bag-of-words
features as our machine learning model. The linear SVM classifier
achieves an accuracy of 87% on the heldout test set.
Our main task in this paper is to evaluate human performance
with assistance from machine learning models. To do that, we
conduct a user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Turkers are
recruited to determine whether a review in the heldout test set is
genuine or deceptive. In other words, humans are asked to per-
form the same task as the machine on the test set. We follow a
between-subject design: each turker is assigned a level of machine
assistance along the spectrum (Figure 1) and labels 20 reviews after
going through three training examples and correctly answering
an attention-check question. To incentivize turkers to perform at
their best, we provide 40% bonus for each correct prediction in
addition to the 5 cent base rate for a review. We also solicit our
participants’ estimation of their own performance and basic de-
mographic information such as gender and education background
through an exit survey. We only allow a turker to participate in the
study once to guarantee sample independence across experimental
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(a) Heatmap (without showing predicted labels), an instance of feature-based explanations.
(b) Predicted label with accuracy.
(c) Predicted label + heatmap (without accuracy).
Figure 2: Example interfaces with varying levels of machine assistance. Figure 2a only presents feature-based explanations
of machine predictions in the form of heatmap. Figure 2b shows both the predicted label and an explicit statement about
machine accuracy (87%). Figure 2c shows the predicted label with heatmap, but does not present machine accuracy. We crop
the “Genuine” and “Deceptive” buttons in Figure 2b and 2c to save space.
setups. Given that there are 320 test reviews and that we collect five
turker predictions for each review, each experimental setup has a
total of 80 turkers. Refer to the appendix for more details regarding
our user study and survey questions.
Varying levels of machine assistance. Humans are the main
agents in our experiments and make final decisions; machines only
provide assistance, which can be ignored if humans deem it useless.
An ideal outcome is that human performance can be improved with
minimal information frommachine learning models so that humans
retain their agency in the decision making process. To examine how
humans perform under different levels of influence from machine
learning models, we consider the following presentations along the
spectrum in Figure 1 (we only show three interfaces in Figure 2 for
space reasons; see the appendix for more).
• Control. Humans are only presented a review. This setup con-
tains no information from machine learning models and humans
have full agency.
• Feature-based explanations. Since ourmachine learningmodel
is linear, we present two versions of feature-based explanations
by highlighting words based on absolute values of weight co-
efficients. First, we highlight the top 10 words in each review
with the same color (highlight). Second, we use heatmap to show
gradual changes in weight coefficients among the top 10 words.
The most heavily-weighted words are highlighted in the darkest
shade of blue. Soft-highlighting (heatmap) has been shown to
improve visual search on targeted areas for humans [40]. Note
that we do not indicate the sign of features to avoid revealing pre-
dicted labels. Humans may pay extra attention to the highlighted
words and accordingly make decisions on their own. Figure 2a
shows an example interface for heatmap.
• Example-based explanations. This method (examples) is in-
spired by example-based interpretable machine learning [34].
Humans are presented two additional reviews from the training
data, one deceptive and one genuine that are most similar to the
review under consideration. This setup resonates with nearest
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(a) Human accuracy with varying levels of machine assistance.
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(b) Human accuracy with predicted labels (and other information).
Figure 3: Human accuracy with varying levels of assistance. In Figure 3a, control provides no assistance; examples, highlight,
and heatmap present explanations ofmachine predictions alone; predicted label w/o accuracy shows predicted labels; predicted
label w/ accuracy shows predicted labels and reports machine accuracy that suggests strong machine performance. It is clear
that showing predicted labels is crucial for improving human accuracy. Adding an explicit statement of machine accuracy
further improves human accuracy. Figure 3b further investigates the combinations of predicted labels and their explanations,
and presentsmachine performance as a benchmark. Intriguingly, we find that adding explanations achieves a similar effect as
adding an explicit statement of machine accuracy. All p-values are computed by conducting t-test between the corresponding
setup and the first experimental setup in the figure (“control” in Figure 3a and “predicted label w/o accuracy” in Figure 3b).
neighbor classifiers. Humans can potentially make better deci-
sions in this setup than in control by comparing the similarity
between reviews.
• Predicted label without accuracy. The above two approaches
only show explanations of machine predictions, but do not re-
veal any information about predicted labels. The next level of
priming presents the predicted label. If humans fully follow ma-
chine predictions, they will perform much better than chance
and likely lead to an upper bound in this deception detection task
for humans. However, humans may not trust the machine due to
algorithm aversion [15].
• Predicted label with accuracy.We may further influence hu-
man decisions by explicitly suggesting that machines perform
well in this task with 87% accuracy. Figure 2b shows an example
for predicted label with accuracy. Note that such strong recom-
mendations may not be desired due to ethical and legal concerns
(see our discussion in the introduction).
• Combinations. Finally, we combine feature (example)-based
explanations and predicted labels. Note that we do not show
machine performance to avoid strong priming. Figure 2c shows
an example of predicted label + heatmap without information
about machine performance.
Hypotheses. We formulate the following hypotheses regarding
how well humans can perform with machine assistance and how often
humans trust machine predictions when predicted labels are available.
• Hypothesis 1a. Feature-based explanations and example-based
explanations improve human performance over control.
• Hypothesis 1b. Heatmap is more effective than highlight as gradual
changes in weight coefficients can be useful, as shown in Kneusel
and Mozer [40] for visual search. Feature-based explanations are
more effective than example-based explanations since the latter
requires a greater cognitive load, i.e., reading two more reviews.
• Hypothesis 2. Showing predicted labels significantly improves hu-
man performance compared to feature (example)-based expla-
nations alone. Assuming that humans trust the machine and
follow its prediction, showing predicted labels can likely improve
human performance because the machine accuracy is 87%. How-
ever, showing predicted labels reduces human agency, so it is
important to understand the size of the performance gap and
make informed design choices.
• Hypothesis 3.By combining predicted labels and feature (example)-
based explanations, the trust that humans place on machine pre-
dictions increases, as it has been shown that concrete details can
influence the level of trust in general automation [44].
We evaluate the above hypotheses using two metrics, accuracy
and trust. Accuracy is defined as the percentage of correctly pre-
dicted instances by humans; trust is defined as the percentage of
instances for which humans follow the machine prediction. Note
that we can only compute trust when predicted labels are available.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we investigate how varying levels of assistance from
machine learning models along the spectrum in Figure 1 affect hu-
man predictions. We first discuss aggregate human performance
using human accuracy and trust. Our results show that in this
challenging task, explanations alone slightly improve human per-
formance, while showing predicted labels can significantly improve
human performance. When predicted labels are shown, we examine
the level of trust that humans place on machine predictions. Our
results suggest that humans can somewhat differentiate correct
machine predictions from incorrect ones. Finally, we present in-
dividual differences among our participants based on information
collected in the exit survey. Our dataset and demonstration are
available at https://deception.machineintheloop.com/.
4.1 Human Accuracy
We first present human accuracy measured by the percentage of
correctly predicted instances by humans. Our results suggest that
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(a) Trust in machine predictions.
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Figure 4: The trust that humans place on machine predictions. Figure 4a shows that adding feature-based explanations
(heatmap) can effectively increase the trust level compared to predicted label w/o accuracy. p-value in Figure 4a is computed
by conducting t-test between the corresponding setup and predicted label w/o accuracy. Figure 4b breaks down the trust based
on whether machine predictions are correct or incorrect and shows that humans trust correct machine predictions more than
the incorrect ones in all the five experimental setups, although the differences are only statistically significant in two setups.
showing predicted labels is crucial for improving human perfor-
mance. Featured-based explanations coupled with predicted labels
are able to induce similar human performance as an explicit state-
ment of strong machine accuracy. As such, adding feature-based
explanations to predicted labels may be more ideal than suggesting
strong machine performance as the priming is weaker and may
facilitate a higher level of human agency in decision making.
Explanations alone slightly improve human performance
(Figure 3a). As Figure 3a shows, human performance in control
is no better than chance (51.1%). This finding is consistent with
Ott et al. [60] and decades of research on deception detection [7].
Explanations alone slightly improve human performance over con-
trol, and the differences are statistically significant for highlight and
heatmap, not for examples. However, the best explanations, heatmap,
is not statistically significantly different from highlight (p = 0.335)
or examples (p = 0.069). As a result, our findings partially supports
Hypothesis 1a and rejects Hypothesis 1b.
These findings suggest that it is difficult for humans to under-
stand explanations on their own. This is plausible for example-based
explanations since it requires extra cognitive burden and estimating
text similarity is a nontrivial task for humans. For feature-based
explanations, it seems that the improvement is driven by the small
number of training reviews that we provide to explain the task.
First-person singular pronouns provide a good example: one of the
training reviews is deceptive and highlight many occurrences of
the word, “my”. A participant said, “I tried to match the pattern from
the example. In the example. the review with the most "My’s" and
"I’s" were deceptive”. In other words, the improvement in heatmap
and highlight may not happen at all without the training reviews,
which indicates the difficulty of interpreting these feature-based
explanations and the importance of explaining the explanations.
One possible direction is to develop automatic tutorials to teach the
intuitions behind important features, which is related to machine
teaching [51, 68, 82].
Showing predicted labels significantly improves human per-
formance (Figure 3a and 3b). As Figure 3a shows, showing pre-
dicted labels drastically improves human performance (61.9% for
predicted label w/o accuracy, a 21% relative improvement over con-
trol; the differencewith heatmap is statistically significant (p <0.001)).
By presenting machine accuracy as shown in Figure 2b, the perfor-
mance is further improved to 74.6% (predicted label w/ accuracy in
Figure 3a, a 46% relative improvement over control).
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. The big perfor-
mance gap between showing predicted labels and showing feature
(example)-based explanations alone suggests that when humans
interact with machine learning models, it makes a significant dif-
ference whether predicted labels are shown. However, this obser-
vation also echoes with concerns about humans overly relying on
machines [44].
To further understand human performance with predicted la-
bels, we examine all experimental setups with predicted labels in
Figure 3b. Although showing predicted labels seems necessary for
achieving sizable human performance improvement, the effect of
presenting machine accuracy can be moderated by showing fea-
ture (example)-based explanations. We find that predicted label +
examples and predicted label + heatmap outperform predicted label
w/o accuracy (69.7% and 72.5% vs. 61.9%), without presenting the
machine accuracy. In this case, we observe that heatmap is more
effective than examples, and leads to comparable human perfor-
mance with predicted label w/ accuracy. There is still a gap between
the best human performance (predicted label w/ accuracy) and ma-
chine performance (74.6% vs. 87.0%). These observations suggest
that humans do not necessarily trust machine predictions.
4.2 Trust
We further examine the levels of trust that humans place on ma-
chine predictionswhen predicted labels are available. Sincemachine
performance surpasses human performance in control by a wide
margin in this task, higher levels of trust are correlated with higher
levels of accuracy in our experiments. However, these two metrics
capture different dimensions of human predictions because trust
is tied to machine predictions. This becomes clear when we break
down human trust by whether machine predictions are correct or
not. We find that humans tend to trust correct machine predictions
more than incorrect ones, which suggests that humans can some-
what effectively identify cases where machines are wrong. It is
important to emphasize that our focus is on understanding how
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(a) Human estimation of their own performance.
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(b) Gender and hint usefulness in predicted label + heatmap.
Figure 5: Heterogeneity findings among participants in our study. Figure 5a shows performance estimation by participants in
three different experimental setups. Figure 5b presents the performance of participants in predicted label + heatmap group by
two variables, hint usefulness and gender.
human trust varies along the spectrum rather than manipulating
the trust of humans in machines.
Feature (example)-based explanations increase the trust that
humans place onmachine predictions (Figure 4a).We further
introduce random heatmap by randomly highlighting an equal
number of words as in heatmap to examine whether humans are
influenced by any explanations including random ones.
Our results are consistent with Hypothesis 3: both feature-based
and example-based explanations increase the trust of humans in
machine predictions. In fact, predicted label + heatmap leads to a
similar level of trust as predicted label w/ accuracy, although the
latter explicitly tells humans that the machine learning model “has
an accuracy of approximately 87%”. In other words, when predicted
labels are shown, heatmap can nudge humans in decision making
without making strong statements of machine accuracy. Interest-
ingly, random heatmap also increases the trust level significantly,
suggesting that even irrelevant details can increase the trust of hu-
mans in machine predictions. The fact that heatmap is significantly
more effective than random heatmap (78.7% vs. 73.4%, p < 0.001)
indicates that humans can interpret valuable information in weight
coefficients beyond “the placebo effect”.
Humans tend to trust machine predictions more when ma-
chine predictions are correct. (Figure 4b). We next examine
whether humans trust machine predictions more when machine
predictions are correct than when they are incorrect. Figure 4b
shows that in all the five experimental setups with predicted la-
bels, our participants trust correct machine predictions more than
incorrect ones. However, the difference is statistically significant
only in predicted label w/ accuracy (p < 0.001) and predicted label w/
heatmap (random) (p = 0.015). These results suggest that humans
can somewhat differentiate correct machine predictions from incor-
rect ones. Further evidence is required to fully understanding the
reasons why humans (don’t) trust (in)correct machine predictions.
Such understandings can improve both machine learning models
and their presentations to support human decision making.
4.3 Heterogeneity in Human Perception and
Performance
We finally discuss the heterogeneity between participants in our
study. Here we focus on the participants’ estimation of their own
performance and gender differences. Refer to the appendix for
additional comparisons.
Human estimation of their own performance (Figure 5a).We
ask participants to estimate their own performance in our exit sur-
vey. Our results are not exactly aligned with the previous finding
that humans tend to overestimate their capacity of detecting ly-
ing [20]. In fact, ∼42% of the participants correctly predicted their
performance. Among the remaining, ∼18% overestimated their per-
formance, while ∼40% underestimated their performance. Figure 5a
shows the breakdown for three experimental setups. In general,
it seems difficult for humans to estimate their performance. One
participant who overestimated his performance (estimated 11-15
but got 10 correct) said, “I enjoyed this hit. When I was a young
man, I was a manager in the hotel business and got to read a lot of
comment cards from guests. I hope that I was pretty accurate in my
answers”. Another participant who underestimated his performance
(estimated 6-10 but got 15 correct) said, “It was difficult to determine
if they were genuine or deceptive. I don’t feel certain on any of my
choices”.
Heterogeneity in performance across individuals (Figure 5b).
Wehave so far focused on average human performance comparisons
between different experimental setups. It is important to recognize
that the performance of individuals can vary. Exit survey responses
allow us to study such heterogeneity. We focus on two properties in
the interest of space. Refer to the appendix for a complete discussion
of heterogeneity between individuals.
First, individuals who find the hints useful outperform those
who find the hints not useful. The difference between these two
groups in Figure 5b (predicted label + heatmap) is statistically sig-
nificant. This observation resonates with our analysis regarding
the trust of humans in machine predictions and holds in 5 out
of 8 experimental setups (this question was not asked in control),
although the differences are only statistically significant in three
setups.2 Second, we find that females generally outperform males.
This observation holds in 8 out of 9 experimental setups, but none
of the differences is statistically significant. Our results contribute
to mixed observations regarding gender differences in deception
detection [14, 46, 52, 53].
2The low number of statistically significant differences is expected, because human
performance is low unless we show predicted labels.
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Figure 6: Human accuracy and trust given varying statements of machine accuracy. Figure 6a and Figure 6b show that human
accuracy and trust generally declinewith statements of decreasingmachine accuracy despite the fact thatmachine predictions
remain unchanged. Note that the decline of human trust with statements of decreasing accuracy is small. Only by adding
frequency explanations, human accuracy and trust become closer to not showing any indication of machine accuracy, i.e.,
predicted label w/o accuracy.
5 VARYING STATEMENTS OF MACHINE
ACCURACY
Given the strong influence of predicted labels andmachine accuracy,
a natural question to ask is how human judgment changes if we
vary the statement of machine accuracy. For example, instead of
the true accuracy of 87%, we could claim that the machine has
an accuracy of 60%. It is important to emphasize that since these
statements of accuracy are not true, we do not recommend this
approach as part of our spectrum in Figure 1 and thus put these
results in a separate section. However, we think that it is valuable
to understand how varying statements of accuracy might influence
human predictions.
Although human accuracy and trust generally decline with
statements that suggest lower accuracy, statements of ma-
chine accuracy improvehuman trust inmachine predictions
even when the claimed accuracy is only 50%. To understand
human accuracy with varying statements of machine accuracy, we
use predicted label w/o accuracy and predicted label w/ accuracy (87%)
as benchmarks. In Figure 6a and Figure 6b, human accuracy and
trust with varying statements of machine accuracy all fall between
these two benchmarks as expected. Here we focus on the blue bars
filled with forward slashes that correspond to simple statements of
machine accuracy, “The machine predicts that the below review is
deceptive. It has an accuracy of approximately x%” (x = 70, 60, 50).
As the claimed accuracy declines from 87% to 50%, human accuracy
and trust decrease, with the exception of human accuracy from
70% to 60%. However, the decline in human trust and accuracy
is fairly small. For instance, predicted label w/ accuracy (50%) still
outperforms predicted label w/o accuracy significantly. The results
are surprising and counterintuitive since one should put less trust
in a machine that has only an accuracy of 50% as compared to a
machine that boasts 87%. Our findings suggest that any indication
of machine accuracy, be it high or low, improves human trust in
the machine. This observation echoes prior work on numeracy that
suggests that average humans and even doctors struggle with inter-
preting and acting on numbers [6, 62, 63, 69]. Therefore, it is crucial
that we develop a better empirical understanding of how humans
interact with explanations and predictions of machine learning
models in decision making before using these machine learning
models in the loop of human decision making.
Frequency explanations can help humans interpret and act
on statements of machine accuracy. To further investigate hu-
man interaction with varying statements of machine accuracy, we
add frequency explanations to the statement with accuracy 50% and
60%. Specifically, we show participants “The machine predicts that
the below review is deceptive. It has an accuracy of approximately
50%, which means that it is correct 5 out of 10 times.” instead of
“The machine predicts that the below review is deceptive. It has an
accuracy of approximately 50%.” The results are shown with the
red bars filled with stars in Figure 6a and Figure 6b. We find that
frequency explanations reduce the trust that humans place on ma-
chine predictions. For instance, human accuracy in predicted label w/
accuracy (50%) + frequency explanation is ∼7% lower (p=0.003) than
in predicted label w/ accuracy (50%). Similarly, human trust in pre-
dicted label w/ accuracy (50%) + frequency explanation is ∼10% lower
(p<0.001) than in predicted label w/ accuracy (50%). Furthermore,
the differences in human accuracy and trust are not statistically
significant between predicted label w/ accuracy (50%) + frequency
explanation and predicted label w/o accuracy. These observations
suggest that frequency explanations can help humans interpret
statements of machine accuracy, in which case a statement of 50%
accuracy with frequency explanation is almost the same as not
showing machine accuracy. Our frequency explanations are also
known as frequent format and have been shown to bemore effective
for conveying uncertainty than stating the probability [25, 26, 66].
6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study to investigate
whether machine predictions and their explanations can improve
human performance in challenging tasks such as deception detec-
tion. We propose a spectrum between full human agency and full
automation, and design machine assistance with varying levels
of priming along the spectrum. We find that explanations alone
slighlty improve human performance, while showing predicted la-
bels significantly improves human performance. Adding an explicit
statement of strong machine performance can further improve
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human performance. Our results demonstrate a tradeoff between
human performance and human agency, and explaining machine
predictions may moderate this tradeoff.
We find interesting results regarding the trust that humans place
on machine predictions. On the one hand, humans tend to trust cor-
rect machine predictions more than incorrect ones, which indicates
that it is possible to improve human decision making while retain-
ing human agency. On the other hand, we show that human trust
can be easily enhanced by adding random heatmap as explanations
or statements of low accuracies that do not justify trusting machine
predictions. In other words, additional details including irrelevant
ones can improve the trust that humans place on machine predic-
tions. These findings highlight the importance of taking caution in
using machine learning for supporting decision making and devel-
oping methods to improve the transparency of machine learning
models and its associated human interpretation.
As machine learning gets employed to support decision making
in our society, it is crucial that the machine learning community not
only advances machine learning models, but also develops a better
understanding of how these machine learning models are used and
how humans interact with these models in the process of decision
making. Our study takes an initial step towards understanding
human predictions with assistance from machine learning models
in challenging tasks.
Implications and future directions.Our results show that expla-
nations alone slightly improve human performance. One reason for
the limited improvement with explanations alone is that although
we provide explanations during the decision making process, we
provide limited resources to “teach” these explanations. A possible
future direction is to develop tutorials for machine learning models
and their explanations to relieve some cognitive burden from hu-
mans, e.g., summarizing the model as a list of rules, adding heatmap
in examples or providing a sequence of training examples with ex-
planations and sufficient coverage. This direction also connects to
the area of machine teaching [51, 68, 82].
Another possible direction to improve the effectiveness of expla-
nations is to provide narratives. Our results suggest that feature-
based and example-based explanations provide useful details for
machine predictions to improve the trust of humans in machine
predictions. It can be useful if we can similarly provide rationales
behind feature-based and example-based explanations in the form
of narratives. A qualitative understanding of how turkers inter-
pret hints from machine learning models may shed light on the
requirements of effective narratives.
Last but not least, it is important to study the ethical concerns of
providing assistance from machine learning models in human deci-
sion making. Our results demonstrate a clear tradeoff in this space:
it is difficult to improve human performance without showing pre-
dicted labels, but showing predicted labels, especially alongside
machine performance, runs the risk of removing human agency.
Human decision makers with assistance from machines further
complicate the current discussions on the issue of fairness in algo-
rithmic decision making [12, 28, 38]. As the adoption of machine
learning approaches can have broad impacts on our society, such
questions require inputs from machine learning researchers, legal
scholars, and the entire society.
Limitations.We use Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit partici-
pants, but this may not be a representative sample of the popula-
tion. However, we would like to emphasize that turkers are likely
to provide a better proxy than machine learning experts for un-
derstanding how humans interact with assistance from machine
learning models in critical challenging tasks. Also, our explanations
are derived from a linear SVM classifier and nearest neighbors. It
may be even more challenging for humans to interpret explanations
of non-linear classifiers.
Another important challenge in understanding how humans in-
teract with machine learning models lies in the difficulty to assess
the generalizability of our results. Our formulation of deception
detection represents a scenario where machines outperform hu-
mans by a wide margin and humans may have developed false
beliefs about this task, as most humans have read reviews online.
In order to consider a wide range of tasks, e.g., bail decisions and
medical diagnosis, we need a framework to compare different tasks.
Machine performance and humans’ prior intuition are probably
important factors that can influence human interpretation of the
explanations. However, it remains an open question whether there
exists a principled framework to reason about these tasks. At the
very least, it is important for our community to go beyond simple
visual tasks such as OCR and object recognition, especially for the
purpose of improving human performance in decision making.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Amazon Mechanical Turk Setup
To ensure quality results, we include several criteria for turkers:
1) the turker is based in the United States so that we assume Eng-
lish fluency; 2) the turker has completed at least 50 HITs (human
intelligence tasks); 3) the turker has an approval rate of at least 99%.
Before working on the main task, turkers need to go through a
short training session, in which we show three reviews from the
training data. We present the correct answer after turkers make
their prediction. The interface during training is exactly the same as
in the actual experiment. After making predictions for 20 reviews,
turkers are required to fill out an exit survey that solicits their
estimation of their own performance in this task and basic demo-
graphic information including age, gender, education background,
and experience with online reviews (screenshots in Figure 15 and
Figure 16). If the HIT is approved, the turker is compensated a dol-
lar and bonuses depending on the number of reviews he correctly
predicted. For example, if a turker makes 11 correct predictions, he
is compensated $0.22 in addition to a dollar. The average duration
for finishing our HIT is about 11 minutes (Figure 7 shows the CDF
of the duration). Turkers spend the shortest amount of time on
average (8.3 minutes) in predicted labels w/ accuracy and the longest
amount of time on average (14.4 minutes) in examples, which is
consistent with our expectation about extra cognitive burden from
reading two more reviews. To sanity check that participants pay
similar attention throughout the study, Figure 8 shows the average
accuracy with respect to the order in which reviews show up3:
there does not exist a downward trend. All results are based on the
9 experimental setups in Section 4 of the main paper and results
with varying statements of accuracy are not included.
A.2 Experiment Interfaces
This section shows example interfaces for the other five exper-
imental setups that are not shown in the main paper (predicted
label + heatmap (random) has the same interface as predicted label
+ heatmap except that words are highlighted randomly).
• Control (Figure 17a).
• Highlight (Figure 17b).
• Examples (Figure 18a).
• Predicted label w/o accuracy (Figure 18b).
• Predicted label + examples (Figure 19).
3Thanks to suggestions from anonymous reviewers.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of study duration in 9 ex-
perimental setups.
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Figure 8: Average accuracy with respect to review ordering
in 9 experimental setups.
A.3 Individual Differences
Here we present further results on heterogeneous performance
among individuals. We present figures for four experimental setups
that are representative of different levels of priming: heatmap, ex-
amples, predicted label w/o accuracy, and predicted label + heatmap.
Hint usefulness (Figure 9). As discussed in the main paper, hu-
man performance is better for participants who find hints useful
than those who do not find hints useful in 5 out of 8 experimental
setups. Highlight, heatmap and predicted label w/o accuracy are the
exceptions. The difference in three setups (predicted label + heatmap,
predicted label + heatmap (random), predicted label w/ accuracy) is
statistically significant.
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Figure 9: Human accuracy vs. usefulness of hints.
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Gender differences (Figure 10). Females generally outperform
males, in 8 out of 9 experimental setups. None of the differences is
statistically significant.
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Figure 10: Human accuracy vs. gender.
Review sentiments (Figure 11). One possible hypothesis is that
humans perform differently depending on the sentiment of reviews.
Indeed, we observe that humans consistently perform better for pos-
itive reviews (8 out 9 experimental setups). However, the difference
is only statistically significant for predicted label w/o accuracy.
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Figure 11: Human accuracy vs. review sentiment.
Education background (Figure 12). There is no clear trend re-
garding education background, which suggests that education levels
do not correlate with the ability to detect deception. For instance,
high school graduates perform the best in predicted label w/o ac-
curcay, but the worst in examples. Since there are five groups, each
group is relatively sparse. We thus did not conduct statistical testing
for these observations.
Age group (Figure 13). There is no clear trend regarding age
groups either. For instance, participants that are 61 & above per-
form the best in predicted label w/o accuracy, but worst in predicted
label + heatmap. Similarly, since there are five groups and that each
group is also relatively sparse, we did not conduct statistical testing
for these observations.
Review experience (Figure 14). There is no clear trend regarding
experience of writing reviews. With the exception of control and
predicted label + heatmap (random), the group that reports the best
performance is either users who write reviews weekly or users
who write reviews frequently. Again, we did not conduct statistical
testing for review experience.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Accuracy (%)
Predicted label
+ heatmap
Predicted label
w/o accuracy
Examples
Heatmap
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
72.3
70.0
49.2
59.3
71.3
63.8
55.0
60.8
76.8
59.4
51.0
57.5
71.9
60.0
55.2
55.4
Some high school
High school graduate
Some college credit
Vocational training
Bachelor’s degree
Figure 12: Human accuracy vs. education background.
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Figure 13: Human accuracy vs. age groups.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Accuracy (%)
Predicted label
+ heatmap
Predicted label
w/o accuracy
Examples
Heatmap
70.8
61.3
56.2
58.7
72.7
64.1
54.5
58.2
73.5
56.6
52.1
56.3
75.0
65.8
60.0
58.0
65.0
N.A.
45.0
40.0
Never
Yearly
Monthly
Weekly
Frequently
Figure 14: Human accuracy vs. review writing experience.
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Figure 15: Survey questions for control group.
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Figure 16: Survey questions for all the other groups.
On Human Predictions with Explanations and Predictions of Machine Learning Models FAT* ’19, January 29–31, 2019, Atlanta, GA, USA
(a) Example interface for control.
(b) Example interface for highlight.
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(a) Example interface for examples.
(b) Example interface for predicted label w/o accuracy.
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Figure 19: Example interface for predicted label + examples.
